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German unification. Particularly notable is Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice's study Germany unified and Europe transjbrmed: a study in statecraft.'0 Both its authors are academics who participated in the diplomacy of unification as members of the American National Security Council during the Bush administration. Their scholarly book draws on still classified US sources, as well as German and Soviet documents and extensive interviews with key political actors. It is the first study to offer such a highly detailed and documented account of the negotiations which settled the international aspects of German unification. In fact, Zelikow and Rice's particular perspective might have provided a good starting point for an explanation of the events they describe, but they fail to offer one. Not only do they emphasize the role of the NSC over the state department throughout," but stick to the simple goal of providing a 'first draft' of history. They state openly that their intention was to 'tell the story of this extraordinary episode in modern diplomacy' (from their perspective).'2 Zelikow and Rice skirt the questions 'why' and 'how' and simply relate 'what exactly happened'.
II
Two recent German publications have now remarkably amended the state of research on the political processes which produced German unification, in particular by shedding light on West Germany's unification policies. The first book is a special publication of documents from the Federal chancellery's files (Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes I9849/9o) as part of the series Dokuimente zur Deutschlandpolitik, published by the Bundesministerium des Inneren with the participation of the Bundesarchiv.'3 The second is political scientist Werner Weidenfeld's AuJ3enpo1itikjfur die Deutsche Einheit, volume iv of the edition Geschichte der deutschen Einheit. It is an official history on the international aspects of German unification in I989-90 commissioned by the German chancellery and based among others especially on the above-mentioned documents. '4 In fact, for the first time since the founding of the German Reich in I87I, a German government has declassified and printed confidential, even secret, files on such a recent and central period of their work. Federal chancellor Helmut Kohl personally took the initiative'5 for the declassification of 43o documents from the West German chancellery, which are all printed in the collection of documents. The printed sources give insight into the decision-making process and the negotiations for the re-establishment of German unity from the Western and more specifically West German side. 15 There was speculation whether the publicity of the chancellor's initiatives in summer I998 was a tactical move by Kohl to enhance his chances in the autumn I998 Federal elections, by reminding the people of his services to the country's unification. See Gunter Hoffman, 'Ein Kanzler schreibt Geschichte', Die Zeit, 4June I998, p. i. discussions, notes, memoranda, and strategy papers. Less than a decade after German unification, scholars now have the unique possibility to be able to assess more precisely the West German chancellery's unification policies in I989-90. Unfortunately, it is difficult to use the document-edition and Weidenfeld's study in combination, as Weidenfeld does not make reference to the printed version of documents, but to the archive repositories and their numbering. For this reason, I will refer in my footnotes to both books. Werner Weidenfeld's official history of the foreign political aspects of German unification is extraordinary and one of the finest of its kind. In parallel to the making of the collection of documents, his research team was granted access not only to those sources to be printed in the special edition but also to various other classified material in the following government institutions: the Federal ministry for intra-German relations, the Federal ministry for domestic affairs, the West German permanent representation in East Berlin, and West CDU's and East SPD's committees. Central contents of the sessions of the Federal cabinet between autumn I 989 and late I 990 were also made available. As no other historian will have the chance to see all the documents Weidenfeld was able to evaluate until the files' official declassification in 2020, 6 this monograph will set the terms for new scholarly debate. It is an excellent and historically detailed account of the international aspects of the German unification process; unification which, he concludes, was successfully achieved thanks to 'favourable conditions, statecraft and quite a bit of luck' . Weidenfeld's study should be read in conjunction with Zelikow and Rice's work, as they are similar in style as well as in their conclusions. However, Weidenfeld is more analytical in his approach and with the aid of the West German documents he is able to provide additional answers to various questions. These include, in particular, the genesis of Kohl's Ten Point Programme (publicly presented on 28 November i989) and its international implications, the complications in Franco-German relations, the struggles around the Polish border recognition issue, and the impact of West German financial aid for the USSR on Gorbachev's political decisions.
Weidenfeld's official history consolidates the picture that scholars have so far gained of the early stages of the German unification process. When the Berlin wall came down on 9 November i989, the number of East Germans crossing the border to West Berlin exploded. The East Germans began to demand the unity of German people at mass demonstrations, catching everyone by surprise: the GDR's leadership, which had only intended to liberalize the travel law; the West German government, whose chancellor was on an official state visit in Poland and who interrupted his visit for an appearance in Berlin; the Four Powers, which de iure were in charge of any matter concerning Germany and Berlin as a whole and theoretically were even in charge of the border checkpoints in Berlin.'8
We know now that the nineteen days following the fall of the Berlin wall were decisive for the process of German unification and especially for the development of a West German policy programme as to how unification could happen. Weidenfeld makes it unmistakably clear that initially the Kohl government had no strategic concept to deal with the East German people's demand for unification. In his attempt to put the Ten Point Programme in an analytical perspective, Weidenfeld asserts that it turned unification rhetoric into an operative (or concrete) policy.22 Yet later he states that the Ten Point Programme had only been a means to avoid the cementing of the existence of two German states23 and that due to the lack of any time-frame, the programme was not a unification plan, but rather a concept or programme with the final goal of German unification.24 In his study's conclusion, however, Weidenfeld again refers to the Ten Point Programme as the starting point for unification policies in an operative sense.25 Weidenfeld bases his argument on Teltschik's and Kohl's memoir accounts, in which Teltschik -who, as discussed above, seems the initiator and creator of the ten points -implicitly acknowledges the fact that the ten points were indeed a unification plan,26 whereas Kohl simply refers to the official term Ten Point Programme.27 None of them makes a theoretical distinction about the criteria for the terms plan or programme.
The use of terminology is very important, however, since in historical perspective the assessment of the historical value and importance of the ten points depends on whether they were a definite plan implying steps to be taken on the road to unification or simply a general concept with the possibility of unification as the final goal. By referring to studies of pre-I989 West German Deutschlandpolitik, unification rhetoric and operative unification policies of the I 950s, this confusion can be clarified. First of all, how can an operative unification policy be defined and, secondly, could the Ten Point Programme be considered as a unification plan? An 'operative unification policy' entails the creation of concrete plans which have as their aim Germany's staatliche unification and which are closely adhered to by the government. In this light, one has also clearly to differentiate between an 'operative unification policy' and Deutschlandpolitik, which were West German policies as they were conducted towards the GDR in intra-German matters. Theoretically the former is a specific instance of the latter; in fact, these terms are neither mutually exclusive nor fully interchangeable. as it had existed since the end of operative unification policies in I960 -and the active accomplishment of the goal, the possibility of which had seemed unrealistic since the building of the Berlin wall in i96i.29 Borrowing traditional Social Democratic Ostpolitik rhetoric about the 'all-European process' and the 'peace order' while simultaneously returning to the idea of 'change through strength' that was characteristic of Adenauer's policies, Kohl's speech proved his bipartisan credentials. The programme's novelty, as well as its impact, lay in the way these ideas were presented: namely, as a plan for the achievement of German unity in several stages of development, yet without a time-frame. It is the achievement of a goal by stages which makes the ten point concept a plan.
Indeed, from the ten points one could infer that the chancellor's focus was on practical operative unification policies as part of the intra-German convergence. Kohl's immediate political targets seemed to be: direct negotiations with the GDR, free and democratic elections in the GDR, and a German economic and monetary union.30 Yet, when he would begin these policies depended on the dynamism of the unification process and on Kohl's improvisation. Weidenfeld correctly establishes that, with Kohl's address, the East German people could see that the idea of unification had become a real possibility, something they could demand. It provided a focal point and a Western leader to the emerging East German public mood.31 Unfortunately, Weidenfeld fails to analyse and explain the crucial significance of what he widely describes, namely that the Ten Point Programme gave justification 'from above' to the unification process 'from below '.
With this explanation in mind, Kohl's reasons for secrecy before announcing the ten points and the subsequent domestic and international reactions to his presentation become much clearer. Teltschik and Kohl feared that after the East Germans' demand for unification, Federal foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher or former chancellor Willy Brandt could take the initiative,32 and so it had been decided to create the plan in absolute secrecy. As Weidenfeld discusses, it had to accomplish four goals. First, it should fuel the interest in, and expectations of, unification that were just beginning to catch fire in the East German demonstration movements.33 Second, the programme should instantly differentiate Kohl politically from his more cautious opponents, better positioning the unpopular chancellor for the West German Federal elections the following year. Third, Kohl wanted to steer both the dynamic developments in the GDR and the East Germans' still ambivalent opinion on unification towards his goal of 28 The failure to consult or inform domestic and international partners conveyed the impression that the West German chancellor was now determined to speed up the movement towards unification and reinforced the concern abroad that unified Germany would be prone to act unilaterally. Particularly abroad the ten point speech was considered as a move towards an operative unification policy, and it was precisely this factor which worried Germany's neighbours.36
The Four Powers had to react to Kohl's surprising offensive. After all, the Allies' reserved rights still overlay Germany's sovereignty, and issues linked to them, such as the question of Germany's relinquishment of the eastern territories and the de iure recognition of the Oder-NeiBe border, had to be finally resolved between the two German states and the Four Powers. Weidenfeld underlines what Zelikow and Rice already revealed in their study, that the US and in particular president George Bush, despite Kohl's secrecy, fully trusted the chancellor and hence unquestionably backed his move towards an operative unification policy, making the US the most important ally for Kohl throughout the unification process. Weidenfeld documents that Kohl had arranged for a long letter including an explanation of the Ten Point Programme to be sent to Bush, before his speech, although his good intentions were thwarted by technical problems.37
In contrast to the very supportive American Deutschlandpolitik, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, as is well known, objected vehemently to German unification and refused for a long time to even consider the issue.38 In contrast, French attitudes were much less clear cut, and it is in particular the excellent and unprecedented analysis of French policies which sets Weidenfeld's study apart. behind it and the extreme differences between Kohl's and Genscher's standpoints became publicly visible.55 Weidenfeld's analysis of the Kohl-Genscher tandem in the unification process is particularly valuable, though sadly his comments are scattered among accounts of specific events and it is only at the very end of his 620 page narrative that he offers a four page general analytical summary of the pair.56 This makes it difficult to follow precisely the development of Kohl's and Genscher's policies and relations. We read that the two surely followed the same aim: German unification and Westbindung.57 Yet during the unification process Kohl and his advisers were focused more on US policies than Genscher and his diplomats, who were trying particularly to sound out the Soviets on the issue of possible NATO-jurisdiction expansion to GDR territory. Unfortunately, Weidenfeld does not really elaborate the differences between chancellor and foreign minister and does not comment on their personal relationship. He explains that the power relations between Kohl and Genscher changed in spring I 990 in favour of Kohl, who decided to deal with certain foreign political issues as a Chefsache --e.g. contacts with the US and arranging the billion-credits (DM) for the USSR -without the involvement of his foreign minister, which of course undercut Genscher's political role.6' But Weidenfeld gives no further details about possible `6 Ibid., pp. 479 With regard to the institutional relations between foreign office and chancellery, Weidenfeld points out the important role of the foreign office's civil service especially in the decision-making process of the Two plus Four talks. Yet, the chancellery was none the less predominant. One reason for this might be Kohl's style of governmental rule, as indeed the chancellery had taken up many foreign political channels itself and bypassed the foreign office.63 A second reason might be the unvariegated source material. The continued classification of most materials in the chancellery and other ministries leaves the current picture of West Germany's policies selective, fragmented, and incomplete, and Weidenfeld's study clearly reveals the problems of such partial, official history. As his book is based on uniquely privileged access to files opened by the chancellor himself, one wonders what secrets might still be found in the unpublished files both of the chancellery and of the foreign office. If the foreign office and in particular Genscher played such a minor role in the important decisions, there would be no reason to keep foreign office files classified.
A final crucial issue on which Weidenfeld has tried to shed light is how the West German government influenced Gorbachev to accept German unification and to consent to a unified Germany's membership in NATO. As Biermann and Adomeit did in their earlier studies, Weidenfeld describes how during i 989
Gorbachev's advisers were playing with various ideas to renew Soviet Deutschlandpolitik, but also notes how Gorbachev clung to the post-war realities of the existence of two Germanies and the status quo on European borders.64 This demonstrates a general weakness in Moscow's foreign policy which became obvious later in the negotiations over Germany's NATO membership. During the entire unification process, the Soviets seemed to lack concepts for political initiatives and co-ordination between the different departments. They continued to hold on to status quo policies even when political circumstances had changed. The Kremlin then changed its political course against any internal protests whenever outside pressure of new circumstances demanded a change in the political direction. Weidenfeld underlines in his description of Soviet policies that the two key elements which made Gorbachev take a positive standpoint towards Germany's unity were the idea of a nation's right to self-determination and Kohl's promised financial aid. The latter was particularly important for a Soviet Union that was facing a deepening domestic economic crisis. In contrast, the outcome of the NATO summit is only mentioned in passing in both German accounts whereas the Americans call it the 'final offer for settlement of the German question '.96 The wall on 9 November i 989. There existed no contemporary plans, for operative unification policies and the making of unification plans had stopped in ig60. 107 The problem with Kohl's Ten Point Programme was that its step-by-step approach already lagged behind the real dynamism of the unification process triggered by the East Germans at the time it was announced. As a consequence, the Kohl government's operative unification policy was initially mostly improvisation in reaction to the peoples' strong desire for unification: the West German government followed the accelerating unification process. Yet Kohl's measures were increasingly shaping the developments as, over the next months, he began to exert control and lead the unification process. In fact, he began to push for rapid unification in view of the coming Federal elections, which he wanted to win and so gain a place in history as the 'chancellor of unity'.
Nevertheless, the Germans could not rely uniquely on their right to self-determination and simply push for unification themselves. The Four Power rights still overlay Germany's sovereignty and issues linked to the reserved rights had to be resolved in accord with the Four Powers. Furthermore, historic fears about an enlarged, united Germany dominating the geographic centre of Europe reappeared, as geopolitics dominated the thoughts of politicians all over Europe. It was only after initial coordination problems among the Four Powers -Mitterrand's attempt to establish a historic Franco-Soviet anti-Germany coalition vis-a-vis the strong pro-unification US--FRG axis failed -that the Two plus Four talks finally started in May I990. In fact, the tight US-FRG partnership dominatcd thc entire negotiation period in a way that was only possible as a result of the change in the superpower balance in favour of the West. Parallel to the inner German unification process, the Two plus Four talks were to shape the external aspects of unification, so that the remaining legal issues from the I 940s could be settled by a treaty giving a unified Germany full sovereignty. Unification was finally gained within a year in a way that nobody had ever imagined. Having started as part of the Eastern European transformation process, unification became an independent process which itself generated the alteration of NATO and accelerated the European integration. German unification was the result of a window of opportunity
